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DYNAMIC AND STATIC COMPONENTS OF POLITICAL SUPPORT IN BRITAIN 
Comparative electoral research has r�peatedly demonstrated 
the strong association between socioeconomic attributes such as 
class, religion, region, language, etc. and voting beha�ior [Lipset 
and Rokkan, 1967; Alford, 1963; Rose, 1974). These correlations 
have provided useful profiles of typical party voters and a mode of 
comparison for patterns of support across several nations. Some 
attention has been paid to the behavioral explanations behind these 
correlations, but all too frequently the different ways in which 
the social structure influences electoral behavior have been lumped 
together and empirically ignored. More importantly, while most 
analyses acknowledge the role of party strategy and. voter response 
the "endogenous" component of party support -- few have attempted 
to link structural and political factors within the same framework. 
The result has been that socioeconomic structural explanations of 
electoral behavior have been excessively static, and that rational, 
neo-Dm�sian models have ignored the group processes which 
contribute to stable electoral cleavages. 
This paper will consider a model of the British electo!:ate 
rrhich tries to account for both exogenous structural and endogenous 
political factors. The specification of the proposed model will be 
discussed in some detail and compared with the Butler and Stokes 
paradigm, which places almost exclusive emphasis on exogenous 
structural factors. The estimates obtained from a multivariate 
regression are then used to measure the relative impact of 
structural and political components on individual preferences 
and to draw inferences about the sources of electoral change in 
Britain. We will then confront the other half of the problem; 
namely, can a model which incorporates a significant endogenous 
component successfully account for electoral stability. The 
estimates of issue and lagged partisan components from a second 
set of regressions will form the basis 0f some observations about 
the stability of preferences across individuals in this model. 
THE PROPOSED MODEL 
where 
The structure of the proposed theory is as follows: 
the assessment of party x at the time of entry 
into the electorate 
x At_1= the assessment of party x at time t-1
ux 
0 
the assessment of party x at time t 
background and family socialization pressures 
at the time of entry into the electorate 
the utility derived from party x at time of 
entry into the electorate 
(1) 
(2) 
2 3 
the utlity derived from party x at time t-1 
the utility derived from party x at time t 
b, n, d, m the weights assigned to components of the model 
the error terms of the equations 
At the moment of entry into the electorate, this model suggests that 
an. individual's party assessment of party x will be a function of 
the perceived utility of that party's policies and of background 
factors. The variable B� represents those stable socialization
components such as family and social peer group acceptance which 
create in an individual a predisposition towards one party apart 
from considerations of issue proximity. In England, the variable 
B might be represented by class and family membership, but in other 
countries, membership in a religious, ethnic, agrarian or linguistic 
group may create the comparable social pressure. These conformity 
effects can be explained within either a rational-utilitarian or 
sociological framework. The Downsian might want to call them 
non-issue utilities since there can be high costs to holding 
preferences which are different from those of one's parents, peers 
or co-workers and benefits to be derived in terms of esteem and 
respect from conformity. From a social-psychological standpoint, 
these pressures can simply be explained as role expectations. 
However described, the first way in which the social structure 
influences political preferences in this model is through the 
creation of group loyalties and pressures independent of an 
individual's attitudes. 
It is also possible that background factors are 
important in the transmission of information and the formulation 
of political attitudes as well. Clearly, a variety of factors 
affect and change individual attitudes, but one important source 
is that an individual's position in the socioeconomic structure 
causes that person to assess the impact of policies on his utility 
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from a different perspective than a person in another socioeconomic 
situation. To take an obvious example, the interests of a �vorker 
in a steel mill are affected differently by a deflationary, high 
unemployment policy than are those of a pensioner on a fixed income. 
At the same time, the formulation of opinions is more complex than 
a simple identification of material interest. Most troublesome is 
the possibility that parties through the emphasf's of their platforms 
and propaganda influence individual attitudes. While there is only 
suggestive evidence of this in the British case [Blumler and 
McQuail, 1968], more systematic evidence from American data shows 
that party identification has a descernible causal impact on issue 
evaluations, even though less than the impact of either exogenous 
factors on issues or of issue evaluations on party identification 
itself [Jackson, 1975, pp. 161-185]. It is also likely that 
television and the press partly determine as well as reinforce 
opinion, particularly in the cases of highly media-exposed, 
uncertain or "weakly motivated" individuals [Blumler and McQuail, 1968], 
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and on issues about which the public has little direct knowledge 
[Lippman, 1922; Ure, 1968]. The implication is that individual 
preferences are not fixed, but vary by some function involving 
self-interest, exposure to the media, personality and a stochastic 
error component. 
While social structure is related to attitude formation, . 
the impact of changes in the social structure on party preferences 
is by no means simple. This is so because party preferences will 
vary with the perceived proximity of individual attitudes to party 
positions and will not depend on individual issue attitudes alone. 
If Q is defined as a vector of individual i's preferred positions 
on a set of issues qi1, ... , qin and X is a vector of perceived 
party positions xi1, . . .  , xin' then the value of U� will be greatest 
when Q = X. The common mode of expressing the utility of party 
preference in cases where Q f X is the loss formulation. The logic 
behind the loss formulation has been exhaustively discussed 
elsewhere and need not be replicated in great detail here [Riker . 
and Ordeshook, 1968; Davis et al., 1970]. Briefly, this concept 
suggests that voters are typically confronted with alternatives 
whiyh are less than ideal. This can be expressed as: 
where 
Ux is the utility to individual i from party x's policies t at time t 
I is the normalized value of Ux when Q t x 
L� is the loss to individual i at time t from party x 
The problem which confronts the voter is choosing that alternative 
with the minimal loss. In early spatial models, the calculation 
of loss was usually given a quadratic form: 
where 
(Q - X) I A (Q 
-
X) 
A is a vector of weights assigned to each issue by 
the voter 
Q is the vector of preferred positions 
X is the vector of party positions 
An individual with no predispositions or biases will pref er party 
x to party y if Ux > u� implying that Lx < Ly.t t t 
A change in an individual's socioeconomic position may 
alter that person's views on a set of issues X or on the importance 
he/she assigns to those issues, but any corresponding increase or 
decrease in perceived utility loss will depend on Q as well. This 
demonstrates an important distinction: the causal path of the 
social structure on party preferences through role expectations 
is direct while the impact of social structure on party preferences 
through attitudes is conditional on the behavior of other actors 
in the political system. It is possible for an individual to 
change his/her issue position, but experience no change in partisan 
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evaluation simply because the position of the party shifted in the 
same direction, or for an individual to keep the same issue position 
,but still experience an increase in loss, because the party position 
shifted in the opposite direction. The wider implication is that 
by incorporating an endogenous political component, a model of 
electoral choice can account for changes in the distribution o� 
party support in the absence of cataclysmic social
.
change, or, for 
that matter, can account for stability in the distribution of party 
support despite measurable social mobility, economic growth or 
demographic shifts. The former is particularly important for the 
study of British politics since the decline of major party support 
and the rise in the number of Liberals and abstainers in the period 
1970-74 cannot be attributed to any significant change in the social 
structure [Crewe, 1974]. In models which rely exclusively on static 
socialization components, the forces of habit and conformity are 
so great that the political system automatically gravitates to a 
pattern of stable support. Only major social or international 
upheaval can jar the system from its equilibrium, and then once 
again gravitation towards stability begins. In spatial models, 
support is affected and maintained by party policies and behavior 
in office; it is not automatic, and can be augmented or dissipated 
by political strategy. Since political change in the proposed 
model can come endogenously from within the political system as 
well as exogenously from the social struct11re or international 
system, no single cataclysmic trauma need precede a realignment 
in the electoral system. This will hopefully provide a more 
flexible explanation of political change, capable of accounting 
for anomalies in more static theories such as the Butler-Stokes 
model. 
POLITICAL STABILITY AND ENDOGENOUS COMPONENTS 
If the pitfall of socialization models has been an 
excessive emphasis on the structural determinants of individual 
preferences, early rational theories were less able to account for 
stable group and personal party loyalties. Political scientists 
have discovered that party preferences tend to be more stable than 
attitudes and that some individuals are more immune than others to 
8 
changes in their voting behavior [Campbell et al., 1964; Butler and 
Stokes, 1974). One interpretation of the party identification 
literature is that voters enter an electoral period with biases 
accumulated from the past, and �hat these biases contribute to the 
overall stability of the electoral system. In the framework of a 
rational paradigm, this amounts to saying that individuals utilize 
information and judgments formed at earlier periods as well as 
current knowledge when making choices. The proposed model must, 
therefore, incorporate the notion of partisanship and explain the 
relationship between adjusting and lagged components of voting 
decisions. 
After the point of entry into the electorate, the 
assessment of parties at any time t can be depicted as a shift 
from the previous assessment at t-1 based on a recalculation of 
utility in the period t-1 to t. As we have seen, the assessment 
of a party x at any time t can be expressed as: 
An assessment at t-1 assuming stable parameters over time and 
across the population will be: 
Consequently, the difference between them will be: 
If the value and parameter of B are stable over time, then the 
expression can be simplified to: 
x x The expressi9n (Ut - Ut-l) represents the most recent calcul.ation 
x of policies while the lagged component At-l stands for past 
calculations of utilities as well as stable background factors. 
Downs [Downs, 1957), and more recently Fiorina [Fiorina, 1975], 
have suggested that since different levels of uncertainty are 
associated with different types of information -- past, future, 
past hypothetical, etc. -- information should be accordingly 
weighted. For example, the performance of an incumbent is a 
"harder" piece of information than competing party promises, and 
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consequently ought to be weighted more heavily. A detailed 
examination and estimation of these discount weights is not intended 
here. For the limited purposes of this discussion, we expect a 
coefficient m on At-l to be different from that on (U� - U�_1) where
At-l is the summary measure of these lagged spatial and nonspatial 
effects: 
b (Ux - Ux ) + mAX + u t t-1 t-1 
Theories of socialization also demonstrate that party 
evaluations begin at some point in childhood rather than starting 
from a point of indifference and impartiality with each election, 
but imply falsely that a political preference at any point in time 
is simply the earlier judgment plus a random error component 
[Butler and Stokes, 1974, pp. 33-46]: 
The assumption in theories of socialization that 
A� = A� + e would hold true if U� did not change (since it is quite
plausible to assume that B0 
such that E (U:) = U�. If, on
Bt) '  or at least fluctuated randomly, 
x x the other hand, E (Ut) f u0 then the
assumption will not hold. It is of course possible that for some 
individuals fluctuations of issue distance are random and the 
cumulative effect of these changes is zero. However, if we 
believe that changes in U� are responses to the relative distance 
from party policies, and that party strategy itself is not purely 
random, then we can expect to find nonrandom changes in individual 
party preferences: that is to say, .the continuity and trend of 
party policies and economic conditions ought to be reflected in 
party evaluations. 
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The notion of lagged assessment has important implications 
for the theory of the rational voter. A voter is said to be 
rational when he/she responds to government policies -- subject to. 
the constraints of information -- with an appropriate recalculation 
of preference. An individual at time t with a high previous 
assessment of party x and a low previous assessment of party y will 
not change the order of his previous assessment unless there has 
been a sufficient shift in the differential loss in the period t-1 
to t. It is possible therefore for a rational voter to continue 
r�eferring party x even though the loss in the last electoral 
period from party y was slightly less than the loss from party x. 
In general, we would predict that an individual would prefer party 
x if: 
And moreover that an individual will continue to prefer party x 
if the difference in assessments at t-1 exceeds any opposite change 
in recalculated utility: 
An individual would be indifferent at t if the difference in 
assessment is approximately equal to any opposite change in 
recalculated utility: 
Finally, an individual will alter his order of preference if the 
difference in assessment at t-1 is less than an opposite change 
in recalculated utility: 
m (Axt-l) - m (A
y
t-l) < b (U
Y - uY ) - b(Ux - ux ) t t-1 t t-1 
In this sense, the lagged assessment variable in this model 
resembles the concept of partisan identification for Butler and 
Stokes and that of party identification in the American voting 
literature. x If At-l were to reach a sufficiently high level, 
the marginal impact of recent utility adjustments would be quite 
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small. A high assessment of party x as the result of reinforcing 
past utility calculations and nonspatial predispositions could 
then be defined as a high level of partisanship. The voter's 
probability of voting for party x would be very high: the pattern 
of voting over time would be stable and small changes in 
evaluations would not be reflected in voting behavior. 
There are then three sources of stability in the 
proposed model. First, the solidity of the underlying social 
structure will contribute to stable individual attitudes over time. 
This point should be viewed with some caution, however, since 
(1) any model of attitudes must be more complex than a simple 
identification of socioeconomic self-interest and because (2) the 
proximity of individual attitudes to the parties in the electoral 
system will depend on the behavior and statements of the parties 
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in and out of office. Vote maximizing party behavior is, therefore, 
the second source of stability in the proposed model in the sense 
that parties will shift their positions in response to change in 
the underlying distribution of opinions. Finally, the accumulatjon 
of background biases as well as information and opinions acquired 
over the years serves as a buffer against the insecurity of 
instantaneous changes in voter affiliations. The fact that parties 
can draw on the accumulated credit of their partisans gives them a 
predictable base of support to build on. 
A TEST OF THE THEORY AGAINST THE BUTLER AND STOKES HODEL 
It might be illustrative to compare the proposed theory 
with the Butler-Stokes paradigm [Butler and Stokes, 1974, pp. 1-12]. 
Their study attempts to explain the correlation of class with party 
in Britain by means of social-psychological concepts. Butler and 
Stokes claim that enduring alignments are founded on cleavages and 
maintained by secondary processes such as the transmission of 
parental affiliation and the inuu nization of party preferences in 
older voters. They acknowledge that the connection of class to 
party can occur through either of two routes: either voters 
perceive that the parties are "diffusely" representative of class 
interests, or issues intervene in the perception. They conclude, 
however, that issues only wear at the fringes of a cleavage 
maintained primarily by psychological mechanisms, because the level 
of knowledge about the ends and means of specific policies is very 
low in the British electorate [Butler and Stokes, 1974, pp. 181-195]. 
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The misunderstanding that being well informed on a wide 
range of issues is essential to spatial models of voting behavior 
is based on the false notion that issues ought to be weighted equally 
by the voter in the assessment of parties. If this were true, then 
it would certainly be irrational for voters not to know where the 
parties stand on each policy matter. If on the other hand, voters 
weigh issues unequally -- perceiving some to be more important to 
their welfare or conscience than others -- then the rational 
individual need only be informed about salient issues since the 
marginal gain from the increment of knowledge on less relevant areas 
might well be less than the costs of acquisition. The University 
of Essex electoral unit analyzing the February 1974 election found 
that ceteris paribus people '"ere more likely to have preferences 
and to be able to distinguish between the parties on issues which 
they regarded as important [Alt et al. , 1974]. Moreover, they 
found that the level of accurate perception on major issues was 
very high even without controlling for salience. 
Therefore, this model takes issue with the Butler-Stokes 
argument that alignments in Britain are maintained primarily by 
social-psychological processes and maintains instead that parties 
must continually reinforce voter predispositions through specific 
policy positions. Neglect on issues which are salient to its 
supporters will wear do'vn party loyalties despite the psychological 
processes of parental transmission and immunization, as Hindess has 
sho'vn in his study on the Labour Party and its working class 
constituencies [Hindess, 1971]. The empirical question then is 
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can we construct a test which will tell us whether the primary 
determinants of party preference are the independent effects of 
class and family, or rather of issue evaluations. At the same 
time, we will want to incorporate the notion that issue positions 
are not fixed and must be identified since they may be determined 
by a complex simultaneous equation involving the social structure, 
the influence of elites, partisanship and perhaps other factors. 
To compare properly the relative impact of issue and 
background components, it is necessary to specify both effects in 
the same equation, This gives us a regression equation which 
implies that a voter's assessment of the parties in 1974 was a 
function of that person's evaluation of specific issues in 1974 
and of direct class and family socialization effects. This is 
specified as follows: 
where 
A�4 is the assessment of the Conservative and LabourParties in 1974 as measured by a feeling thermometer 
score 
C is the respondent's class as measured by an 
occupation scale 
F is the father's partisan preference weighted by 
the intensity of his political preference 
Lx is the summary loss or issue distance measure
Ihe data is taken from a 1974 general election survey by the 
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University of Essex. The variable for class in an interval scaling 
(i.e . 1 to -1) of the standard A, B, c1, c2, D, E occupational code 
frequently used in British survey research. The family variable is 
a dummy for the reported affiliation of the respondent's father 
weighted by another variable measuring the father's recalled 
interest in politics. The proxy for issue evaluations in 1974 is 
the weighted sum of losses or distances across a set of seven 
issues where a loss is defined as the absolute value of the 
difference between the respondent's·own position and the perceived 
party position multiplied by the salience measure: 
where 
pij is individual i's view on issue j 
xij is individual i's perception of party x's position on issue j 
aij is the measure of importance or salience of issue j to individual i 
The strictly linear form of the loss variable implies that rate of 
loss is constant at all distances on the issue scale. Clearly, 
other assumptions are possible, but experimentation revealed the 
linear form to be empirically superior. 
Strictly speaking, only five of the issue variables were 
constructed in this manner -- devolution, taxation, social services, 
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the Common Market, and nationalization -- while the prices and 
strikes variables followed a slightly modified form . Downs argued 
that.where an issue involved the relative competence of two 
opposing parties rather than some clearly defined ideological 
difference, the voter had to calculate his current party 
differential on the basis of his comparative assessment of how the 
government handled the particular problem in question and his 
expectation of how the opposition party would have handled the 
problem had it been in office [Downs, 1957, pp. 36-50]. Economic 
questions are of ten thought to fall into this valence category 
[Butler and Stokes, 1974, pp. 238-242]. It seemed useful, therefore, 
to construct the prices and strikes variables in a manner that 
would take into account the respondent's differential assessments 
and expectations. The 1974 questionnaire asked the respondents to 
rate how well the Conservative Government handled prices and strikes 
in its four years in office, and how well they thought the Labour 
Party would have handled the problem had it been in office during 
this period. These responses were then combined to give the judged 
utility difference: 
where 
Strikes 
Prices 
Con PC.
on , p are the respondent s assessments is ' l.r the Conservatives handled prices 
strikes (s) 
of how well 
(r) and 
PLab p�ab are the respondent's assessments of how well is ' ir the Labour .Party would have handled prices 
(r) and strikes (s) 
ais ' air are the salience weights 
These two basic forms of information about the voter's attitudes 
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are combined in a manner such that we expect a positive coefficient 
for the issue evaluation measure in the Conservative equation and 
a negative coefficient for that in the Labour equation, but in both 
cases the implication is that as losses decrease on the five 
position issues and the differential increases on the valence 
(i. e. prices and strikes) issues, the party assessment will rise. 
In the estimation of the model, the class and family 
variables were treated as exogenous, but the issue evaluation 
measure is treated as endogenous. The justification for this 
follows from the discussion earlier about the danger of treating 
issue attitudes as fixed and also from the obvious possibility that 
measur'ed proximity could be primarily the result of respondents 
making preferred party position and their own revealed position on 
any or all issues congnitively consistent. This could be 
characterized as a simultaneous equation bias. To correct for this 
bias, the issue variable was identified by a set of attribute 
variables in a two stage least squares procedure [Johnston, 1973, 
pp. 278-284; Jackson, forthcoming]. 
The estimated equations are shown in Table 1. It would 
appear from the results that the coefficient on the variable 
measuring the direct effects of class socialization is insignificant 
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TABLE 1 
THE GENERAL MODEL WITH LINEAR LOSS VARIABLES 1974 
Aeon 74 A
Lab 
74 A
eon 
74 A
Lab 
74 
Class -. 02 -. 10 . 03 
( . 06) (. 07) (.10) 
FCon .56* . 43* 
( . 13) (.20) 
FLab . 24 -.22 
(.13) ( .18) 
FLib 
L74 7.99* -10. 47* 
19. 77* 
( . 47) ( . 56) (. 91) 
Constant 6. 70 6.57 . 27 
R2 . 36 .30 . 52 
SE 2. 10 2. 40 3. 14 
Type of 
Estimation 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
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at the conventional 5 percent level in both the Conservative and 
Labour equations. Perhaps even more damaging from the standpoint 
of the Butler-Stokes theory is the result that the family variable 
is significant in the Conservative case only. If the transmission 
of political loyalties through the family is truly the backbone of 
the British party system, then at the very least we ought to be 
able to reject the null hypothesis on the family coefficient in 
both equations: the fact that we cannot seriously challenges the 
credulity of their theory. 
An important feature of both equations is the large size 
and significance of the issue evaluation coefficients as compared 
with those on class and family . Not only is the.coefficient on 
I74 significant in each major party equation, but the size of the 
coefficients, even allowing for the standard errors, is quite 
remarkable . This point can be illustrated by comparing the effect 
on partisan evaluations of changes in the socialization components 
of the model with the effect of small changes in issue evaluations 
in a simulation using the estimated coefficients from the 
regression and hypothetical values. There are two issue conditions 
to manipulate in this simulation: the distance or loss between 
an individual's preference and the perceived party position, and 
the importance which the voter attaches to that issue. If a unit 
loss is defined as that amount by which individual and party 
positions are separated from each other on an interval scale, then 
by taking the estimated issue coefficients, it is possible to 
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calculate the amount of change in Conservative and Labour 
evaluations produced by the increment of each unit loss for all 
three salience conditions. These values are shown in Tables 2 and 
3. In this exercise, we want to compare the degree of change in 
partisan evaluation caused by a small incre�se in perceived loss 
between self and party as opposed to that induced by a substantial . 
alteration in socialization factors. Moreover, we distinguish 
between degrees of concern for the issues, and estimate different 
amounts of partisan shift for various levels of salience. 
Comparing across the tables generally, it appears that 
small changes in loss (i. e. one unit) produce estimated shifts in 
evaluations of .75 for Labour and . 57 for the Conservatives in the 
cases of salient concerns, and .37 for Labour and . 28 for the 
Conservatives in the cases of moderately important issues. How do 
these scores compare with large changes in background factors? In 
the Conservative equation, changes in class status -- no matter 
how large -- will not significantly affect an individual's 
assessment of the Tories, but a shift from a background of total 
apathy to one of strong pro-Conservative Family interest causes a 
predicted change of .56 in that person's Conservative evaluation. 
This is slightly less than the change that would accrue from an 
increase of one unit loss on a salient issue, or a two unit loss on 
a moderately salient issue. In the Labour equation, neither the 
family nor the class variable had significant coefficients, implying 
that it is likely that neither produces significant changes in 
Labour assessments. Even if the family variable were significant, 
TABLE 2 
CHANGES IN LABOUR EVALUATIONS 
Moderately 
Intense Intense 
1 unit loss .75 .37 
2 unit loss 1.49 .75 
3 unit loss 2.24 1.12 
4 unit loss 2.99 1.49 
TABLE 3 
CHANGES IN CONSERVATIVE EVALUATIONS 
Moderately 
Intense Intense 
1 unit loss .57 .28 
2 unit loss 1.14 .57 
3 unit loss 1. 71 .85 
4 unit loss 2.28 1.14 
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Not 
Important 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Not 
Important 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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however, its maximum effect on Labour evaluations would be .24, 
which is considerably less than the effect of a unit increase in 
an issue distance of a salient issue -- i.e • .  75 -- and even less 
than the effect of a unit increase in distance of a moderately 
salient issue -- i. e . •  37.
The conclusion seems to be, therefore, that small changes 
in issue calculations produce as great or greater shifts in party 
evaluations as do large -- even improbable -- shifts in background 
factors. The implication of this finding is very important for 
models of the British electorate. It indicates that a significant 
variability in party evaluations -- and hence, a significant 
variability in voting behavior -- will result from small changes 
in issue proximity, and that socialization factors per se will not 
have as much impact. The British electorate is thus extremely 
issue responsive, the larger meaning of which for macropolitical 
models of political change in Britain is that even drastic changes 
' 
in the consistency of family backgrounds or in the patterns of 
social mobility will not have the same impact on party evaluations 
that increases or decreases in issue distance across the population 
will have. Any rate of change in the social structure which is 
less than drastic will probably have no significant direct impact 
on voting behavior. 
A TEST OF THE STABILITY OF MODELED PREFERENCES 
. 
' 
Can a model which depends so heavily on endogenous 
political factors successfully explain electoral stability? In 
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addition to the stabilizing effects of party behavior and the 
social structure, it has been argued that voters enter an electoral 
period with predispositions as the result of background factors and 
accumulated judgments. In this sense, voters are in varying degrees 
"partisan" and their choices at time t are made with different 
amounts of preformed bias. As the biases build, voters will be 
less responsive to current party strategy and policies and will 
resemble what political scientists call a party identifier. 
The crucial question, therefore, is to what degree were the 
calculations of voters in 1974 a function of (1) their preferences 
in 1970 and (2) of recalculations of issue utility as the result 
of information acquired during the period 1970-74. The proposed 
test is an equation specifying an individuals assessment in 1974 
as a function of the previous assessment in 1970 and the 
recalculation of utility from 1970 to 1974. The lagged previous 
party assessment becomes a summary measure of an individual's past 
issue calculations and socialization biases, and the issue 
evaluation variable becomes a measure of the amount and direction 
of recalculation: 
where 
A;4 is the respondent's feeling thermometer rating ofparty x in 1974 
x A70 is the respondent's feeling thermometer rating ofparty x ·in 1970 
x r74 is the measure of issue evaluations in 1974 
To estimate this equation, both r;4 and A;0 are treated 
as endogenous variables, and an instrumental variables procedure 
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applied. An instrument for the issue evaluation measure is needed 
for the reasons enumerated earlier: namely, that issues are 
measured with error and may interact with partisan preference. The 
lagged feeling thermometer is also treated as an endogenous 
variable since there is good reason to expect correlation between 
the error term of the implicit equation for the lagged assessment 
and unspecified explanatory factors which fall into the stochastic 
term u. The variables used to create the instruments are again a 
set of exogenous attribute data. The data for these equations come 
from a 1970-74 panel begun by Butler and Stokes and continued by 
the electoral research unit at the Universit:; of Essex. The issue 
evaluation measure consists of five issues -- i.e. the social 
services and devolution questions are missing -- coded on an 
interval scale and weighted by the appropriate salience measures. 
The implication of this coding is that individuals with high 
positive partisan scores will fa.vor the Conservatives and those 
with high negative scores will favor the Labour Party. This 
measure is less general than the loss specification, but, for the 
purposes of the simulation argument which follows, it gives us a 
better measure of the ideological component of support. 
The results of the estimation are shown in Table 4. The 
coefficients on the issue evaluation variables are significant in 
TABLE 4 
AN ESTIMATION OF CHANGING PARTISAN ASSESSMENTS 1970-74 
A Con 74 A
Lab 
74 A
eon 
74 
_ ALab 74 
I74 3.Sl* -6 .09
>� 7.30* 
(.79) (. 89) (1. 42) 
A Con .06* .06* 70 ( .01) ( .01) 
ALab .OS* -.07* 70 (. 0] '\ (. 01) 
Constant 2.14 3.18 .60 
R2 .so .Sl .64 
SE 1.84 1.87 2.78 
Type of 
Estimation 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
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all cases, and the signs are in the appropriate directions: thus, 
the null hypothesis can be rejected for both components of the 
model. The coefficients on issue evaluations are large in all 
cases, but the ratio of the issue evaluation component to the 
lagged assessment coefficient is substantially larger in the Labour 
than in the Conservative equation. 
It was argued earlier that the implication of this model 
was that the order of an individual's preference will not change 
unless there has been a sufficient offsetting recalculation of 
utility. Individuals with high previous assessments of a given 
party will require a greater degree of contradictory information 
before their preferences change than individuals with low previous 
party differentials. In this sense, high partisanship as defined 
in the proposed model resembles the notion of party identification 
frequently found in the literature of American and comparative 
politics. High partisanship means that an individual brings a 
substantial predetermined bias to an electoral decision at any 
time t: the greater the amount of predetermined bias, the more 
immune an individual's preference will be to change induced by 
rational responses to immediate issues. 
This point can be illustrated with the estimated model by 
sett:f.ng the major party differential equation to 0 and solving for 
Con Lab r74 given different values of A70 and A70 • If we begin with the 
extreme case of the individuals who assessed the Conservatives in 
1970 at 90 and Labour at 10, they are predicted to be indifferent 
between the parties in 1974 if r74"' -.73, to prefer the 
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Conservatives if I74 > -.73 and to prefer Labour if I74 < -. 73.
Since the mean of the sample is -.01, a score of -.73 represents 
a set of attitudes highly skewed to the left. To get a better 
idea of the degree of extremity and intensity of different scores, 
a table of prototypical one issue scores has been computed for the 
panel variable. These represent the scores an individual would 
have if he/she had one intense extreme issue concern or one fairly 
intense extreme issue concern, etc.: 
Extreme 
Moderate 
Intense 
+ I74 = -.16 
+ I74 = -.08 
Fairly Intense 
+ 
I74 = -.04
Clearly, individuals who previously rated the Conservatives at 90 
and Labour at 10 would have had to develop substantial and intense 
disagreements with the Conservatives in the period 1970-74 on over 
half of the issues in the evaluation measure before the order of 
their preferences changes. Since we must presume that these 
individuals were previously quite close to the Conservatives -- a 
score of 90 implies considerable proximity to the Conservatives in 
1970 -- it is fair to conclude that a shift in the order of 
preference for these individuals would require an almost 
inconceivable change in attitude orientation. Small disutilities 
from or indifference to the most recent Conservative policies would 
not significantly affect the preferences or behavior of these 
individuals. Consequently, they will exhibit the stable preferences 
29 
and behavior of the so-called party identifier. 
The indifference values can also be found for less extreme 
cases. Some examples are shown in Table 5. The model predicts 
quite plausibly that individuals with low or indifferent previous 
assessments will change the order of their preferences in response 
to small changes in opinion. Such individuals resemble those who 
have traditionally been called "independents" in American voting 
studies and "non-identifiers" by Butler and Stokes. Their 
pre!erences will in general be less stable, and they will have a 
higher propensity to switch their vote or abstain. 
The estimations show that as the margin of previous 
assessment increases,, a greater amount of contradictory information 
in the most recent period will be needed to shift the order of an 
individual's preference. The limitations on change -- particularly 
at the highest levels of partisanship -- seem even more significant 
when it is recalled that (1) individuals are not likely to feel 
strongly or be informed about all issues, (2) that attitudes at any 
time t are unlikely to be different on every single issue from what 
they were at time t-1, and that, therefore, (3) any shift in 
attitudes sufficient to alter a high previous differential would 
involve an almost inconceivable reversal of attitudes. On the other 
hand, it is not difficult to see why there might be considerable 
volatility in the preferences of individuals in the middle ranges. 
Clearly, individuals are shown to have different degrees of 
vulnerability to change. 
This analysis resists the temptation of classifying 
TABLE 5 
SIMULATED PARTISANSHIP 
Cases Aeon 70 A
Lab 
70 I74
1 100 0 -.91 
2 90 10 -.73 
3 80 20 -.55 
4 70 30 -.37 
5 60 40 -.19 
6 5 0  5 0  -. 01 
7 40 60 • 16 
8 30 70 . 34 
9 20 80 .52 
10 10 90 .70 
11 0 100 . 88 
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Deviation from I7 
-.90 
-. 72 
-.54 
-.36 
-.18 
0 
.17 
. 35 
.53 
• 71
.89 
individuals into discrete categories although it makes the 
distinction between levels of partisanship. Partisanship is 
, likened to a predetermined bias having the form of a continuous 
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probability distribution with different likelihoods of behavior at 
various points along the continuum rather than as identifiably 
distinct qualitative states. Voting is one type of behavior which 
will be a function of partisanship, but it is quite possible that 
partisanship affects political participation as well. The level of 
partisanship can change drastically or gradually over time in 
response to government and party behavior, but the impact of party 
behavior will not be uniform at all points on the partisanship 
distribution. The preferences of high and low partisans (i.e. 
those with either large positive or negative party differentials) 
will be less affected by unit shifts in attitudes than moderate 
partisans (i.e. those with small party differentials) • 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly, it is possible to link socioeconomic and 
political components successfully in a single model of voter choice • 
It has been proved that the endogenous evaluation component has a 
significant impact and is far more powerful than the psychological 
factors which are so crucial to the Butler-Stokes theory. This 
raises the possibility that party systems can change as the result 
of factors within the political system: i-.:> particular, as the 
result of responses to party strategy and performance. The 
implication is that macropolitical models need not depend so 
heavily on theories of social determinism. At the same time, the 
insights about group pressures and individual biases which 
political scientists have borrowed from psychology and sociology 
need not be discarded entirely. Rather, it is possible to 
incorporate them into the general model and use them to help 
account for stability within the political system. 
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